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HARD LABOR: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SHACKLING
FEMALE INMATES DURING PREGNANCY AND
CHILDBIRTH
ABSTRACT
Despite international human rights guidelines that prohibit the
practice, thirty-eight states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons cur-
rently allow corrections officials to shackle pregnant inmates during
the third trimester of pregnancy. Of these, twenty-three states and
the Bureau also allow restraints to be used during active labor. Only
two state legislatures, Illinois and California, have addressed the issue
of using physical restraints on pregnant inmates; the vast majority
of states rely on corrections officials to craft policy.
This article analyzes both states' justifications for shackling
policies as well as the Constitutional and human rights arguments
that have been posed by inmates and their advocates for eliminating
the use of physical restraints during pregnancy and childbirth. A
historical overview of the treatment of female prisoners as well as an
analysis of the current impact of pregnancy in American prisons will
reveal that shackling policies are impractical at best, and in the worst
scenarios, seriously life-threatening. The second section addresses
potential judicial remedies for female inmates who have been affected
by shackling policies. Until the mid-1990s, prisoners seeking redress
for civil rights violations such as inhumane and senseless use of
physical restraints were most likely to turn to § 1983 litigation. Since
the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996, prisoner
plaintiff's access to the courts has been limited by heightened proce-
dural and evidentiary requirements that do not apply to the general
public. Therefore, in the final section, this paper concludes that female
prisoners and their advocates will most likely have to turn to alter-
native methods of relief, including innovative prison programs like
Catch the Hope, implemented in the Massachusetts state prison
systems to provide adequate prenatal and postnatal care within the
limitations of a correctional environment.
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CONCLUSION
The doctor came and said that yes, this baby is
coming right now, and started to prepare the bed for
delivery. Because I was shackled to the bed, they
couldn't remove the lower part of the bed... [or]put
my feet in the stirrups. My feet were still shackled
together, and I couldn't get my legs apart.... [M]y
baby was coming but I couldn't open my legs.
Finally the officer came and unlocked the
shackles from my ankles. My baby was born then.
I stayed in the delivery room with my baby for a
little while, but then the officer put the leg shackles
and handcuffs back on me and I was taken out of
the delivery room. 1
INTRODUCTION
No one knows for sure how many babies are born in the nation's
jails and prisons each year.2 Midway through 2005, the Bureau of
1. Maria Jones, former inmate of the Cook County, Illinois jail, in AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE": VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN IN CUSTODY 64, 65 (1999), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/
engAMR510011999 [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PARTOFMY SENTENCE"].
Jones was imprisoned on drug charges. Id. at 64. She had never been charged with or
convicted of a violent offense and was not considered an escape risk. Id.
2. Nat'l Inst. of Corr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, What is the Difference Between Jail
and Prison?, http://web.archive.orgweb/20061002035022/http://www.nicic.orgWebPage
_378.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). Use of the phrase "corrections" is intended to
encompass both prison and jail populations. Id. According to the National Institute of
Corrections, typically'jails are locally-operated correctional facilities that [usually] confine
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Justice Statistics found that female offenders account for approxi-
mately ten percent of the nation's corrections population.' The
Sentencing Project, a non-profit research and advocacy organization
that opposes the use of incarceration for many non-violent offenses,
calculated that 40,000 new inmates are admitted annually.4 A 1999
Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that five percent of female
prison inmates and six percent of those in jail are admitted during
pregnancy.5 Based on these surveys, the New York Times has esti-
mated that 2,000 children are born to women in jails each year.6 Of
course, these studies were conducted by separate organizations with
different agendas, in three different years, and used three different
statistical samples.7 None of the studies take into account the effect
of release of jail inmates prior to childbirth; abortion, miscarriage,
and stillbirth; or impregnation during incarceration on the rate of
live births.' At best, "2,000 births" represents an extremely rough
estimate. 9
Therefore, it is difficult to know how many mothers and children
are affected by the widely-embraced practice of shackling female in-
mates during pregnancy, labor, and childbirth. Despite international
human rights guidelines that prohibit the practice,"° thirty-eight
persons [with] ... sentence[s] of 1 year or less.... Prisons are operated by either a
state or the federal government, and they confine only those individuals who have been
sentenced to 1 year or more of incarceration." Id.
3. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB'L NO. 213133, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 5,
8 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf (indicating that
just over 200,000 women populate the nation's jails and prisons).
4. See Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2006, at A16.
5. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB'L No. 175688, WOMEN OFFENDERS 8 (1999), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf.
6. See Liptak, supra note 4.
7. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
8. See id.
9. See Liptak, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, Switz., Aug. 22-Sept. 23, 1955, Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 33-34, U.N. Doc. AICONF.6/L.17 (Dec. 1, 1955).
[C]hains or irons shall not be used as restraints. Other instruments of
restraint shall not be used except in the following circumstances:
(a) as a precaution against escape during a transfer... ;
(b) on medical grounds by direction of the medical officer;
(c)... in order to prevent a prisoner from injuring himself or others or
from damaging property ....
*.. [Restraints] must not be applied for any longer time than is strictly
necessary.
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states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) currently allow cor-
rections officials to physically restrain pregnant inmates during the
third trimester of pregnancy." Of these, twenty-three states and the
BOP also allow restraints to be used during active labor. 2 Legislatures
in only two states, Illinois and California, have addressed the issue of
using physical restraints on pregnant inmates; 13 the vast majority
of states rely on corrections officials to craft policy.14
Actual practices vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 5
Policies address a dizzying array of variables in numerous combina-
tions: the kinds of restraints that can be used; the parts of the body
that can be restrained; the stage of the pregnancy, labor, and delivery;
the inmate's criminal history prior to incarceration and her disci-
plinary history since the beginning of her sentence; and finally, the
amount of discretion held by medical and correctional officials. 6 For
example, "Louisiana and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have no re-
strictions on the application of restraints [on female inmates] other
than specifying that pregnant women should not be restrained face-
down in four-point restraints." 7 In Arkansas, women can also be re-
strained throughout pregnancy, but those with "lesser disciplinary
records" are controlled using a single flexible nylon restraint." Female
inmates in Oregon can be shackled throughout their pregnancies,
but restraints are only used during labor and delivery at the specific
request of the attending medical official. 9
While the specific policies and procedures may vary, the main jus-
tifications for the continued practice of shackling women in advanced
stages of pregnancy and through labor are identical to those used
to justify restraining male or female inmates in the general popula-
tion: to maintain security and decrease flight risk.2" According to the
spokeswoman for one corrections department, officials are faced with
11. Amnesty International, Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct and
Shackling of Pregnant Women (2006), http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/custody/key
findingsrestraints.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Amnesty International,
Abuse of Women].
12. Id.
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3423, 5007.7 (2006); § 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6
(2000). New York is currently considering a bill that would ban the use of physical
restraints on inmates during childbirth. See Assemb. 3804, 2005 Assemb., 228th Sess.
(N.Y. 2005).
14. See Amnesty International, Abuse of Women, supra note 11. Eight states have
no written policy regarding the use of shackles on pregnant inmates and presumably rely
on informal policies and practices. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Liptak, supra note 4.
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the unwelcome burden of balancing inmate health and safety with that
of the general public: 'Though these are pregnant women.., they are
still convicted felons, and sometimes violent in nature. There have
been instances when we've had a female inmate try to hurt hospital
staff during delivery." 
21
This note will analyze both stated justifications for shackling
policies as well as the Constitutional and human rights arguments
that have been posed by inmates and their advocates for eliminat-
ing the use of physical restraints during pregnancy and childbirth.
A historical overview of the treatment of female prisoners and an
analysis of the current impact of pregnancy in American prisons
reveals that shackling policies are impractical at best,22 and in the
worst cases, seriously life-threatening."
The second section will address potential judicial remedies for
female inmates who have been affected by shackling policies. Although
shackling practices have been specifically addressed in only a few
cases, 24 prisoners have successfully challenged inhumane conditions,
which this note will argue are analogous to the shackling policies,
via Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment litigation.2"
Third, the note will examine two alternatives to the current major-
ity approach of ad hoc policies developed by corrections authorities.
First, this note will consider the statutory solutions developed by the
state legislatures of Illinois, California, and New York.2" Finally,
the note will examine Massachusetts' "Catch the Hope" program for
incarcerated mothers; this case study will show that the use of exces-
sive physical restraints on pregnant inmates is unnecessary from
a policy standpoint.27
21. See id (quoting Dina Taylor, spokeswoman for the Arkansas Department of
Corrections).
22. According to William F. Schulz, Executive Director of Amnesty International
U.S.A., "[Shackling] is the perfect example of rule-following at the expense of common
sense .... It's almost as stupid as shackling someone in a coma." (quoted in Liptak,
supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE," supra note 1,
at 66 ("The mother and baby's health could be compromised if there were complications
during delivery, such as hemorrhage or decrease in fetal heart tones. If there were a need
for a C-section... a delay of even five minutes could result in permanent brain damage
for the baby.") (quoting Dr. Patricia Garcia).
24. See, e.g., Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877
F.Supp. 634, 646-47 (D.D.C. 1994), partially aff'd, 93 F.3d 910, 914-15, 918 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
25. See, e.g., Goebert v. Lee County, No. 2:04-cv-505-FtM-29DNF, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31478, at *3 (D.Fla. Dec. 7, 2005).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3423,5007.7 (2006); § 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(2000);
Assemb. 3804, 2005 Assemb., 228th Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
27. See Cathy Romeo, Catch the Hope Program at Massachusetts Correctional
Institution - Framingham: A Model for Providing Critical Services to Incarcerated
2008] 367
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I. HISTORY OF FEMALE INMATES IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
CUSTODIAL AND REFORMATORY MODELS
Women's prisons and female inmates have received little schol-
arly attention because of the fact that women comprise such a small
percentage of the overall prison population, and thus "shed little light
on the nature of the prison system as a whole;" 2 but further, because
it has been assumed that the experiences of women inmates are
simply a smaller-scale version of those of their male counterparts.29
The first separate facilities for women were dormitory-like rooms
adjacent to male prisons;3" gradually, women were placed in their
own cellblocks and came under the supervision of female matrons.31
This segregation arose for practical reasons - the increasing number
of female prisoners and the desire to prevent sexual contact 32 - as
well as the sense, prevalent throughout the period, that female crim-
inals were particularly corrupt.33 Considered more naturally docile
and moral than men, a woman who fell into a life of crime had fallen
far indeed, if she was redeemable at all. 34 This "custodial model"
prison housed mainly felons, 35 and required inmates to work long
hours for little or no pay at industrial jobs that supported the prison
system as a whole.36
The "reformatory model" emerged out of the custodial prisons
during the late nineteenth century, 3' and was characterized by the
paternalistic attitudes that dominated Victorian America.3" Designed
to cater only to women, and mainly those guilty of misdemeanors or
"moral crimes" like prostitution or public drunkenness,39 reformatories
were "decidedly 'feminine' institutions." 40 Inmates in reformatories
Pregnant Women, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 417, 421 (1998).
28. Nicole Hahn Rafter, Prisons for Women, 1790-1980, in 5 CRIME & JUSTICE 129, 129
(Michael H. Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1983) [hereinafter Rafter, Prisons for Women].
29. Id. at 129-30.
30. Id. at 132.
31. Id. at 135-36.
32. Id. at 137, 139.
33. Id. at 138.
34. See L. MARA DODGE, "WHORES AND THIEVES OF THE WORST KIND": A STUDY OF
WOMEN, CRIMES, AND PRISONS, 1835-2000, at 30 (2002); see also Rafter, Prisons for Women,
supra note 28, at 146 (describing female penitentiary inmates as being considered
"unredeemable").
35. Rafter, Prisons for Women, supra note 28, at 143.
36. See id. at 146. For example, some women produced uniforms for the inmates in
other prisons or caned chairs destined to furnish prisons throughout the jurisdiction. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 158.
39. Id. at 157.
40. Id. at 147.
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tended to be younger than women incarcerated in custodial insti-
tutions who were considered more hardened criminals.4 1 One of the
classic characteristics of a reformatory prison was the indetermi-
nate sentences imposed on women in order to assure reformation.42
Cellblocks were abandoned in favor of a "cottage system" in which the
inmate population was dispersed, settled in small "houses" led by
a quasi-maternal matron.43 Rather than performing industrial work
designed to reduce system operating costs, 44 reformatory inmates
were trained to perform domestic tasks that would prepare them for
lives as maids, and eventually wives, after their release.45
II. WOMEN IN AMERICAN PRISONS TODAY
Today's criminal justice system combines the punitive nature
of the early custodial prisons with the differential treatment of the
reformatory system.46 Although a "campus model" aspires to address
the special needs of female inmates while rejecting the gender stereo-
typing of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,47 the
treatment of female inmates in contemporary American correctional
facilities suggests that many of the negative aspects of both historical
models have been retained.48
The brutality and chaos of early custodial facilities is mirrored
by the frequent incidence of sexual violence perpetrated by male prison
guards against women inmates.49 While women in reformatories were
frequently able to maintain custody of their infant children,5" today's
41. Id. at 158. "A few states went so far as to prohibit their reformatories from receiv-
ing women over thirty on the theory that older women were unlikely to reform." Id.
42. Id. at 161. For example, women convicted of prostitution were sent to the Detroit
House of Corrections for three years, without regard to the facts of their case or their
criminal history. Id. They could be paroled before that time, but only if they proved that
their moral character had been reformed. Id.
43. Isabel C. Barrows, The Reformatory Treatment of Women in the United States,
in PENAL AND REFORMATORY INSTITUTIONS 129,133 (Charles Richmond Henderson ed.,
1910) ("It was believed that if small groups could be placed in cottages enough motherly
women could be found to give them the sort of affection which would most surely help to
redeem them.").
44. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
45. Rafter, Prisons for Women, supra note 28, at 162.
46. See id. at 173.
47. Id. at 172.
48. Id.
49. See Deborah M. Golden, American Constitution Society for Law And Policy, The
Prison Litigation Reform Act - A Proposal for Closing the Loophole for Rapists 95, 96
(June 2006), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/2927 (follow "Golden" hyperlink
under "Attachment").
50. Rafter, Prisons for Women, supra note 28, at 175.
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prisons and jails rarely afford inmate mothers this opportunity.51
Furthermore, because women's prisons are typically smaller and there-
fore more costly, female inmates are at a greater risk of being trans-
ferred to new facilities;52 this is a special hardship for incarcerated
mothers.53 Substandard gynecological and obstetrical care has also
been the subject of several prisoner litigation suits, discussed in
greater detail infra Part III."4
The shackling policies themselves hearken back to an era when
convicted women were considered morally subhuman55 and evidence
of sexual activity was especially condemned.56 Many jurisdictions fail
to modify restraint policies to accommodate pregnancy,57 suggesting
an indifference to the special needs of female inmates that dates back
to a custodial era.58 Beyond the fact that shackling policies do not fully
accommodate the uniquely female experiences involved with child-
bearing,59 they also fail to take into account other differences between
male and female inmates that would seem to make shackling female
inmates generally less necessary. According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, "women are substantially more likely than men to be serv-
ing time for a drug offense and less likely to have been sentenced for
a violent crime." 60 Female inmates also generally have shorter, less
violent criminal histories than male inmates: men are twice as
51. Terri L. Schupak, Comment, Women and Children First: An Examination of the
Unique Needs of Women in Prison, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 455, 465 (1986).
52. Nicole Hahn Rafter, Even in Prison, Women are Second-Class Citizens, 14 HUM.
RTS. 28, 30 (1987) [hereinafter Rafter, Even in Prison].
53. See id.; see also TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, WOMENINPRISON: SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991, at 6 (1994), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wopris.pdf. Although approximately the same
percentage of male and female prisoners have children, ninety percent of male inmates,
compared to twenty-five percent of female inmates, report that their children live with
the other parent. Id. Because women are so much more likely to serve as the primary
custodial parent prior to incarceration, the disproportionately high instance of juris-
dictional transfers is especially burdensome for female inmates. See id.
54. See, e.g., Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877
F.Supp. 634, 643-49 (D.D.C. 1994); Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that a state prison had exhibited "deliberate indifference" towards female
prisoners through the neglectful and insufficient administration of prison health services
for women).
55. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 4. Steve Erato, the husband of an inmate who was
shackled during labor stated, "It is unbelievable that in this day and age a child is born
to a woman in shackles. It sounds like something from slavery 200 years ago." Id.
56. See DODGE, supra note 34, at 30.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 11-19.
58. See id.
59. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE," supra note 1, at 62.
60. SNELL, supra note 53, at 1. While nearly one-third of female prisoners are incar-
cerated because of drug convictions, about thirty percent are imprisoned after committing
a violent crime. Id. at 3.
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likely as women to be violent recidivists and more than half of male
prisoners have committed two or fewer offenses, compared to two-
thirds of female prisoners.6 Furthermore, many of the violent crimes
committed by women are perpetrated against current or former part-
ners who had sexually or physically abused them.62
Based on these facts, the average woman inmate seems to rep-
resent a reduced security risk.63 In addition, women are typically
sentenced to shorter prison terms,64 which correlates to a reduced
overall risk of flight.65 This, combined with the reality that pregnant
women - not to mention those in active labor - are physically much
less able to mount an attack or escape attempt,66 suggests that the
proffered justifications for shackling pregnant inmates are based on
a correctional model that was designed for men.
Other aspects of today's women's prisons are more reflective of
the reformatory model.67 Female inmates in general have fewer edu-
cational and recreational opportunities, inferior access to specialized
health care, and are paid less for prison labor.68 A 1994 class action
lawsuit brought on behalf of the current and former inmates of the
District of Columbia Department of Corrections noted:
In the area of academic and college education, women prisoners
receive only half of the male prisoners' access to ABE and GED
classes.
... Work details at [a neighboring men's prison] are not only
more numerous but better in quality .... The men perform details
that prepare them for trades which command better salaries out-
side of prison. There is hardly a comparison of the stereotypical de-
tails at the [women's prison] (receptionist, housekeeper, beautician,
61. Id. at 4.
62. Stephanie S. Covington & Barbara E. Bloom, Gendered Justice: Women in the
Criminal Justice System, in GENDERED JUSTICE: ADDRESSING FEMALE OFFENDERS 3, 4
(Barbara E. Bloom ed., 2003); see also SNELL, supra note 53, at 6 ("Half of the violent
female inmates who had been [physically or sexually] abused [prior to incarceration] were
sentenced for homicide, compared to two-fifths of other violent female inmates.").
63. See Covington & Bloom, supra note 62, at 4.
64. See GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 5, at 10. This is largely related to the fact
that women are less likely to commit serious or violent offenses. Id.
65. See Liptak, supra note 4.
66. Id. (noting that there are no records ofwomen escaping from prison during labor,
and quoting a former prison prenatal instructor: "You can't convince me that it's ever
really happened. You certainly wouldn't get far.").
67. Rafter, Prisons for Women, supra note 28, at 174.
68. Rafter, Even in Prison, supra note 52, at 28.
2008]
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etc.) and the skilled details at [the men's prison] (carpentry,
electrical, mechanical, etc.).69
The Women Prisoners cases not only reveal that modern women's
prisons still struggle with gender stereotyping, but could also prove
interesting case studies for female inmates seeking to bring Consti-
tutional challenges to oppose shackling policies.
III. JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR FEMALE INMATES: EIGHTH
AMENDMENT CLAIMS UNDER § 1983 AND THE PRISON LITIGATION
REFORM ACT
Although only a few published cases deal with the constitu-
tional implications of shackling pregnant inmates,70 the courts have
dealt with a great deal of prisoner litigation brought by individuals
or classes of inmates seeking damages or other forms of relief stem-
ming from inhumane institutional policies. 71 Typically, prisoner
plaintiffs root their arguments in the Eighth 72 and Fourteenth
73
69. Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 634,
677 (D.D.C. 1994), partially affd, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Although the D.C. Circuit
Court ultimately determined that the unequal opportunities that existed between male
and female prisons in D.C. did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the
inmates in the smaller female prisons were not "similarly situated" to their male counter-
parts, the appeals court did not dispute the fact that such inequities existed. See id. at
913, 927.
70. Other cases dealing at least partially with the constitutionality of various state
shackling procedures affecting pregnant inmates have been settled out of court. See,
e.g., Complaint at 1-2, McDonald v. Fair, No. 80352 (Mass. Super. 1985) (class action suit
involving inadequate medical treatment for pregnant women at a state prison for women
in Massachusetts); Settlement Agreement, McDonald v. Fair, No. 80352, § H 28-30
(Mass. Super 1985); see generally Complaint, West v. Manson, No. H83-366 (D.C. Conn.
filed 1983) (class action suit involving living conditions at a state prison for women in
Connecticut).
71. See discussion infra Part IV.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). The "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment provides the basis for most prisoner
litigation lawsuits challenging conditions of confinement. See supra notes 24-25. The
Supreme Court has attempted to define this rather ambiguous language several times,
stating variously that the ban on cruel and unusual punishments "prohibits penalties
that are grossly disproportionate to the offense ... " Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685
(1978) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (holding a fifteen-year
sentence for falsifying a document was disproportionate to the crime and therefore vio-
lated the cruel and unusual punishment clause)). The ban not only prohibits "physically
barbarous treatment," but also all penalties that conflict with "broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency." Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976). In Estelle, the Court held an "inadvertent failure to provide adequate
medical care" does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 105.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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Amendments to the Constitution. However, because the Constitution
does not provide a mechanism for enforcing the rights that it creates,
74
prisoners must sue state agents under a "civil action for deprivation
of rights" as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983."5 Prisoner litigation is spe-
cifically regulated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
which sets up additional hurdles for inmate litigants, and presents
a major challenge for inmates seeking civil damages for constitu-
tional violations.76
A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996
Prisoner suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can illustrate our legal order
at its best and its worst. The best is that even as to prisoners the
government must obey always the Constitution. The worst is that
many of these suits invoke our basic charter in support of claims
which fall somewhere between the frivolous and the farcical and
so foster disrespect for our laws.77
During the 1990s, prisoner litigation became a popular target
for the media, conservative commentators, and law enforcement and
elected officials hoping to cultivate a reputation for being tough on
crime.78 Politicians from around the country responded to public
fears about violent crime by cracking down on prison conditions:
Alabama reinstituted the chain gang,79 then-Governor William F.
74. Golden, supra note 49, at 97 n.11 ('The Constitution itself provides no mechanism
for plaintiffs to enforce in court the rights it comprises. Plaintiffs must sue state actors
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or federal actors under the theory delineated in Bivens v. Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).").
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
Every person who.., subjects... any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution... shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
Id.
76. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1996). The PLRA is a sub-
section of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 41 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994).
77. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 601 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. See, e.g., Barb Albert, Attorney General Seeks to End Frivolous Suits, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Nov. 15, 1994, at Al; Press Release, Sandi Copes, Office of the Attorney General
of Florida, Limits Sought on Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits (Aug. 1, 1995), available at http://
myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/82BO7319CEF98B8C85256220006C3A66
(containing a list of "Attorney General Bob Butterworth's Top 10 Frivolous Prison
Inmate Lawsuits").
79. Frugal Alabama Still Chained to the Past, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Summer
1995, at 19. After Alabama reinstated chain gangs, the Southern Poverty Law Center,
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Weld of Massachusetts opined that prison life should be like "a tour
through the circles of hell,""0 and state prison systems everywhere
cut educational and recreational programs at least in part to diminish
the public perception that prisons were cushy holding pens for the
lazy and delinquent.81
Underpinning the harsh and politicized rhetoric, however, were
legitimate concerns about the number of federal lawsuits brought
by prisoners under § 1983.2 During the 1960s, inmates filed only a
few hundred lawsuits per year;8 3 by 1995, the nearly 40,000 complaints
submitted by prisoners comprised almost a fifth of the federal civil
docket.84 Although many of these complaints may have been dismissed
before trial,85 the remaining cases still accounted for fifteen percent
of all federal civil trials. 6 As Margo Schlanger has commented, "[t]hese
statistics highlight two qualities long associated with the inmate
docket: its volume and the low rate of plaintiffs' success." 87 Lawmakers
and citizens certainly had legitimate frustrations relating to the im-
mense amount of time and money that the federal court system was
dedicating to claims that, as a group, had a very low success rate. 8
However, prisoners - arguably the most unpopular and politically
vulnerable bloc of American citizens - were a particularly easy
on behalf of a group of inmates, sued the Governor under § 1983. Southern Poverty Law
Center, Legal Action: Austin v. James, http://www.splcenter.org/legal/docket/files.jsp
?cdrlD=2&sortID=O (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). The case was settled in 1996 when the
Department of Corrections agreed to halt the practice. Id.; Associated Press, Chain
Gangs Are Halted in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1996 at A14.
80. Robert Worth, A Model Prison, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1995, at 38, 39. Worth
also quotes Weld as stating, "inmates should learn only 'the joys of busting rocks."' Id.
81. See, e.g., id.
82. See Fred Cheesman, II, Roger A. Hanson & Brian J. Ostrom, A Tale of Two Laws:
The U.S. Congress Confronts Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 1983 Lawsuits, 22
LAW & POL'Y 89, 94 (2000) (citing an increase of 1,153 percent in prisoner lawsuit from
1972-1996).
83. Ashley Dunn, Flood of Prisoner Rights Suits Brings Effort to Limit Filings, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1994, at Al.
84. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (2003). "In
1995, inmates filed ... nineteen percent of the [complaints on the] federal civil docket."
Statistics for the "civil docket" exclude habeas corpus petitions and motions to vacate
sentences. Id. at 1558 n.4.
85. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 83 (stating that in 1993, ninety-seven percent of
prisoner suits were dismissed before trial).
86. Schlanger, supra note 84, at 1558. In 1993, only thirteen percent of cases initiated
by prisoners resulted in pro-prisoner verdicts. Dunn, supra note 83.
87. Schlanger, supra note 84, at 1557.
88. See Cindy Chen, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: DoingAway With
More Than Just Chunky Peanut Butter 78, ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 203, 211 (2004) (citing a
study by the National Association of Attorneys General that estimated the states spent
a combined $81 million defending themselves against prisoner suits).
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target 9 for Congressional Republicans riding the wave of the 1994
midterm elections and their proposed "Contract With America."90
The Prison Litigation Reform Act91 was added to the general
statute governing prisoner civil rights in 1996 in order to "unclog
the federal courts from frivolous prisoner litigation." 9 2 Attached to
the general Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, the PLRA
regulates all suits brought by prisoners against public entities by
attacking the problem on two fronts.93 First, Part (d) limits the amount
of attorney's fees and monetary judgments that federal judges can
award inmate plaintiffs.94
The second set of limits, however, targeting prisoner plaintiffs
themselves, is more pertinent to inmates actually submitting com-
plaints to a federal court.9" The PLRA functions by setting a much
higher procedural bar for prisoners than the § 1983 baseline,9" screen-
ing out inmate lawsuits that would have been allowed to go forward
had the plaintiffs not been incarcerated.97 The relevant sections,
mandating that prisoners exhaust administrative relief remedies
before turning to the courts and show proof of physical injury, read:
(a) No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
(42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such admin-
istrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
89. See, e.g., Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1459, 1461 (1997) ('There's absolutely
no political downside to getting tough on prisoners.") (quoting Jenni Gainsborough of the
American Civil Liberties Union's National Prison Project).
90. See Republican Contract With America, http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/
CONTRACT.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) (providing the legislative agenda designed
by Republican members of the 104th Congress, which included a tort reform measure
known as '"The Common Sense Legal Reform Act").
91. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996).
92. Golden, supra note 49, at 97. Golden quotes Senator Spencer Abraham's remarks
during floor debate: "I think virtually everybody believes that while these people are in
jail they should not be tortured, but.., their lives should.., be describable by the old
concept known as hard time." Id.
93. See Chen, supra note 88, at 206-07. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, "[flor
state prisoners, eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working, and playing are all done
under the watchful eye of the State, and so the possibilities for litigation . . . are
boundless." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).
95. Id. § 1997e.
96. Chen, supra note 88, at 207; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
97. See Chen, supra note 88, at 207.
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(c)(2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune... the court
may dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(e) No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined
in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emo-
tional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing
of physical injury.98
Statistics show that the impact of the PLRA was swift and dramatic;99
forty-three percent fewer inmate-initiated complaints were filed in
2001 than in 1995, despite the fact that the actual inmate population
had increased by twenty-three percent in the same time period.100
1. The Administrative Exhaustion Requirement
Prisoners must first prove that they have exhausted all avail-
able "administrative remedies." 101 Typically, prisons, like any large
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(a), (c), (e).
99. See Schlanger, supra note 84, at 1559-60.
100. Id. Prisoner litigation still accounts for more than twenty percent of the federal
civil docket. See ADM1N. OFFICEOFTSE U.S. COURTS, JUDIcIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbls.4.4,
4.6 (2006), available at httpJ/www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006.html (last visited
Jan. 11, 2008).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). On January 22, 2007, the Supreme Court rejected the
heightened pleading requirements that the Sixth Circuit and a number of lower courts
had imposed on prisoner litigants. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921 (2007). The Court
ruled that the PLRA mandates that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense; however, the Sixth Circuit required inmate plaintiffs to allege and
demonstrate administrative exhaustion in their complaints. Id. at 915, 919. Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, made it clear that this decision was a
victory for judicial minimalism rather than a policy-driven ruling primarily intended
to benefit inmate litigants:
There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and
that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.
We are not insensitive to the challenges faced by the lower federal courts
in managing their dockets and attempting to separate, when it comes to
prisoner suits, not so much wheat from chaff as needles from haystacks....
[However,] adopting different and more onerous pleading rules to deal with
particular categories of cases should be done through established rulemaking
procedures, and not ... by the courts.
Id. at 918-19, 926. Nevertheless, Jones v. Bock has left prisoners' rights groups cautiously
optimistic; according to Steven Shapiro, Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union: 'The PLRA severely limits prisoners' access to federal courts. [The Bock]
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institution, have extensive parallel disciplinary and grievance pro-
ceedings based on the chain of command. 102 Part (a) of the PLRA was
presumably designed to strengthen the authority of prison officials
with respect to grievance procedures, and prevent inmates from under-
cutting administrative authority with formal judicial proceedings
that could be dealt with in-house. °3 While this seems reasonable on
its face, the actual effectiveness of such administrative remedies varies
widely from institution to institution and inmate to inmate.
10 4
The actual requirements and time limitations imposed by admin-
istrative grievance processes0 5 can represent a major challenge to
inmates, most of whom are relatively unsophisticated and allegedly
dealing with the physical and emotional aftermath of a serious breach
of their civil rights. 06 While grievance proceedings differ among
states,10 7 the grievance procedure adopted by the BOP exemplifies
the structure and types of requirements placed on inmates.' The
Bureau of Prisons "Administrative Remedy Program" requires in-
mates to seek an "informal resolution" of their grievance prior to be-
ginning the formal complaint process,' 09 but still imposes a deadline
of twenty calendar days on the submission of the first written com-
plaint."o0 In other words, less than three weeks after the incident that
forms the basis of the complaint, the inmate must have approached
a staff member with an informal complaint, received feedback, and
then gone on to file a written complaint."' Compared to statutes of
decision will at least help to ensure that the courthouse door is not completely shut for
prisoners ..." Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Decision
Overturns Draconian Limitations on Prisoner Litigation Imposed by the Sixth Circuit
(Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/scotus2006termjonesv.bockwilliamsv
.overton/28107prs20070122.html.
102. See, e.g., Administrative Remedy, 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.11-542.14 (2002). The formal
grievance procedure for the Federal Bureau of Prisons requires that inmates approach
staff with a verbal complaint before filing a written Administrative Remedy Request with
the facility's designated "correctional counselor," who forwards the Request to the Warden.
Id. §§ 542.13-542.14. Inmates who are unsatisfied with the Warden's response can then
file appeals with the Regional Director and then the National Inmate Appeals Admin-
istrator of the Office of General Counsel. Id. § 542.15(a).
103. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 155 (1992); Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d
620, 624 (9th Cir. 2005).
104. Elizabeth Alexander, The Caged Canary, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 225,
263-66 (2008).
105. 28 C.F.R. § 542.
106. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 104, at 263-66.
107. Michael S. Hamden, An Overview of the Law Governing the Rights of Prisoner,
XXVII FACTS & FINDINGS, May 2000, at 15, available at http://www.ncpls.org/prisoner
rights.htm.
108. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.
109. Id. § 542.13(a).
110. Id. § 542.14(a).
111. Id. §§ 542.13-542.14.
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limitations that provide non-incarcerated citizens months to many
years, depending on the seriousness of the underlying allegation, to
file a complaint, the PLRA's enforcement of administrative reme-
dies severely limits the amount of time that inmates have to pursue
a remedy.112
Further, these formal requirements, while not necessarily onerous
for a non-incarcerated or more highly sophisticated complainant,1
1 3
are clearly designed to enhance administrative efficiency rather than
to facilitate a rapid response to prisoner concerns." 4 The initial
written complaint, which must be submitted on a "BP-9" form pro-
vided by the facility's designated correctional counselor," 5 can address
one complaint at a time; "[i]f the inmate includes on a single form
multiple unrelated issues, the submission shall be rejected and re-
turned without response, and the inmate shall be advised to use a
separate form for each unrelated issue." 16 Inmates can attach a single,
8.5 x 11 inch sheet of paper if the designated form does not provide
sufficient space, but must provide a copy of the additional sheet as
well as a copy of any supporting exhibits."' "Exhibits will not be re-
turned with the response,""' however, and so inmates are encouraged
to make additional copies in order to preserve exhibits if they wish
to keep their appeal options open." 9
The PLRA's administrative exhaustion requirement is not a novel
one, but a traditional exception to exhaustion exists when an agency
has "no power to decree... relief."20 Because of the specificity of
Part (e) of the PLRA, however, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
administrative exhaustion requirement as absolutely unwaiveable,' 2 1
even in circumstances in which a prison's administrative remedies
are clearly inadequate.
122
112. Id.
113. See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the
Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L. J. 417, 441-42 (1993) (rejecting the validity of the
assumption that prisoners possess average intelligence and are thus capable of arguing
their claim before a court).
114. See Chen, supra note 88, at 222.
115. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14(a), (c).
116. Id. § 542.14(c)(2).
117. Id. § 542.14(c)(3).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993) (ruling that the doctrine of administra-
tive exhaustion is inapplicable because the administrative body had "long interpreted its
statute as giving it no power to decree reparations relief').
121. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
122. Id. at 741 n.6 ("Congress has provided in § 1997e(a) that an inmate must exhaust
irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.").
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While this ironclad requirement has undoubtedly reduced the
number of frivolous claims filed against prison officials,123 if only be-
cause inmates with meritless claims are less likely to pursue a com-
plicated administrative process,'24 it has also resulted in the dismissal
of individual claims with real potential and merit. 125 More problem-
atically, the case law suggests that the exhaustion requirement in
the PLRA locks inmates with legitimate civil rights claims into a
system where they are barred from any form of adequate relief, in
violation of the well-established common law principle that a remedy
exists for every wrong.
126
In Goebert v. Lee County, the plaintiff, a female inmate, filed a
lawsuit against the sheriff in the jurisdiction in which she was in-
carcerated 27 as well as against the medical personnel at the Lee
County Jail. 12 Charged with DUI manslaughter, the thirty-eight-
year-old Goebert informed prison officials when she was admitted
that she was four months pregnant with a history of miscarrying and
was considered a "high risk" pregnancy because of her age and blood
type.'29 Five weeks after being admitted, Goebert became concerned
that she was leaking amniotic fluid; she was examined by a nurse and
doctor and an ultrasound was performed. 3 ° Although she was told
at that time that her fetus was healthy, she continued to experience
symptoms and submitted three verbal or written requests to see the
doctor before she was finally admitted to the neonatal distress unit
of a local hospital."' Her fetus died three days later.'32
Goebert argued that administrative remedies were not truly
"available" to her because she did not receive the jail's inmate
123. FRED L. CHEESMAN II, BRIAN OSTROM, & ROGERA. HANSON, NAVL CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, A TALE OF TWO LAWS REVISITED: INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF THE PRISONER
LITIGATION REFORM ACT AND THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY, E-8
(2004).
124. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 630 (9th Cir. 2005).
125. Schlanger, supra note 84, at 1587-90 (characterizing the administrative exhaustion
requirement of the PLRA as risking a "babies-and-bathwater" situation).
126. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 396 (1971).
127. Goebert v. Lee County, No. 2:04-cv-505-FtM-29DNF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31478,
at * 1 (D.Fla. Dec. 7, 2005). The grievance procedure adopted by the Florida Department
of Corrections closely tracks that of the Federal Bureau of Prisons described supra
discussion III.A.1. See Inmate Grievance Procedure, FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN §§ 33-
103.001-.103.019 (2006), available at http://www.flrules.org/gateway/
ChapterHome.asp?Chapter= 33-103.
128. Goebert, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31478, at *1.
129. Id. at *4.
130. Id. at *5-6.
131. Id. at *6-9.
132. Id. at *9.
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handbook, was repeatedly informed that the jail was out of inmate
grievance forms, and personnel wrongly informed her that she was
responsible for retaining and paying for outside medical care.'33 None-
theless, the court found that plaintiff had "failed to fully pursue her
administrative remedies,"'1 4 because she initially complained in-
formally and did not follow the appropriate chain of command.
135
Because "[u]nder the PLRA, [Goebert] had to file an appeal regardless
of whether the relief offered through the administrative procedures
was adequate," the District Court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.'36
Goebert illustrates the fundamental injustice of the administra-
tive exhaustion requirement of the PLRA,137 as it was written by the
legislature 138 and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court.13' Even
when courts, prison officials, and inmates all recognize that so-called
administrative "remedies" are all but meaningless, 14° the prisoner
plaintiff is forced to jump through time-consuming and ultimately
futile hoops in order to justify a court action when the administrative
process inevitably fails.'
This legal fiction would represent a frustrating Catch-22 for non-
incarcerated civilians, but it is especially burdensome for prison plain-
tiffs who are typically seeking remedies for violations perpetrated
by representatives of the very same power structures that formulated
the grievance policy and will determine whether or not the complain-
ant has met its requirements. 14 2 For this reason, the administrative
exhaustion requirements present a major challenge for pregnant
female inmates seeking to challenge shackling statutes. 143 Inmates
who hope to use litigation to force a policy change rather than seek
damages for a clear violation of prison policy will have to tackle the
same administrative structure that creates and enforces the shackling
policy. While an individual prisoner whose rights have been violated
133. Id. at "15.
134. Id. at *18.
135. Id. at *16-17.
136. Id. at *18 (emphasis added).
137. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996).
138. 104th Cong Rec. S14756-14759 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
139. See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
140. See, e.g., Moore v. C02 Smith, 18 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1364 (1998).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Nei v. Dooley, 372 F.3d 1003, 1005 (2004) (claiming prison officials took
retaliatory measures after prisoners filed a grievance against them); Celeste F. Bremer,
James R. McCreight, & Michael Thompson, "Fair and Effective" Prisoner Grievance
Systems: Some Practical Suggestions, 14 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 45 (1994).
143. Rachel Roth, Searchingfor the State: Who Governs Prisoners'Reproductive Rights?,
11 Soc. POL. 411, 433 n.17 (2004).
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may be able to find a sympathetic prison official who will approve
or pass on her complaint, a blanket policy protest is more likely to
be viewed as a threat to the prison order and summarily denied. This
does not mean that female inmates cannot or should not attempt to
use the judicial process to change shackling policies because of the
administrative exhaustion requirements. Prisoners must be prepared
to endure a lengthy administrative complaint and appeals process,'
which has very little likelihood of succeeding.'45 Furthermore, they
must be willing and able to study the grievance proceedings require-
ments carefully and follow them to the letter, lest the slightest
clerical or procedural error bar the doors of the courthouse under
the draconian requirements of the PLRA.'46
2. The "Physical Injury" Requirement
In 1994, the plaintiffs in the Women's Prisoners I class action
suit against the D.C. Department of Corrections successfully argued
that shackling female inmates during the third trimester, labor, and
delivery was a violation of the Eighth Amendment.' The court's
analysis in this case was based on subjective and objective standards
first set forth in Wilson v. Seiter.'48 To meet the objective standard,
the plaintiff "must demonstrate a deprivation which amounts to a
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,"'49 while the subjective
standard requires proof that "prison officials acted with 'deliberate
indifference' to inmate health or safety."'50 Other suits involving
pregnancy and pre-natal living conditions have been based on the
"deprivation of medical care" analysis established in Estelle v.
Gamble.'' This test also contains objective and subjective compo-
nents; an inmate must prove that she had a sufficiently serious
medical need and that the defendant knew of and was deliberately
indifferent to that need. 152
144. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
145. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 84, at 1591 ("[I]nmate plaintiffs have very, very
few successes.").
146. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2402 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 634,
663, 668 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 899 F.Supp. 659 (1995).
148. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)).
149. Id. at 663 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
150. Id. at 664 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
151. Estelle v. Gamble, 492 U.S. 897 (1976); Mary Kate Kearney, DeShaney's Legacy
in Foster Care and Public School Settings, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 277 (2002).
152. See Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349,351 (8th Cir. 1991). Johnson defines "a'serious
medical need' as 'one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment,
or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor's attention."' Id.
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Clearly, the Eighth Amendment standards as they stood in the
mid- 1990s were fact-intensive and highly subjective, not to mention
an evidentiary challenge to inmates whose medical and other records
were in the hands of their courtroom opponents. The 1996 passage
of the PLRA, however, altered the specific landscape of Eighth
Amendment claims by imposing a second procedural requirement,' 53
in addition to the administrative exhaustion section that may well
have barred the plaintiffs' claim in Women Prisoners I and will cer-
tainly prove a challenge for future female inmates fighting the consti-
tutionality of shackling statutes. Part (e) of the PLRA states that "[n]o
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner.., for mental or
emotional injury.., without a prior showing of physical injury."'54
While the administrative exhaustion requirement presents a signifi-
cant procedural challenge for all prison litigants,'55 the physical injury
requirement is a substantive prerequisite that could prove especially
challenging to women seeking to challenge prison restraint policies. '56
The PLRA does not define what its drafters meant by "physical
injury." "' Various Circuit Court decisions, however, have dealt with
the issue on a case-by-case basis and concluded that "although a de
minimis showing of physical injury does not satisfy the PLRA's phys-
ical injury requirement, an injury need not be significant to satisfy the
statutory requirement.""'5 Although this inexact definition leaves a
great deal of room for judicial discretion based on the facts, the courts
have also agreed that physical pain, on its own, does not meet the
§ 1997e(e) requirement,'59 but, if paired with lasting physical effects,
can support a viable claim. 6 ° To give contrasting examples of this
somewhat chilling calculus, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois has found that "headaches, insomnia, stress, and
153. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1996) (showing physical injury).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
155. Chen, supra note 88, at 203.
156. Julie M. Riewe, Note, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner
Litigation Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J. 117, 147 (1997).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
158. Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1245 (D Colo. 2006) (citing Mitchell v.
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 534 (3rd Cir. 2003) (finding that "courts of appeals have read
1997e(e) to require a less-than-significant-but-more-than-de minimis physical injury as
a predicate to allowing the successful pleading of an emotional injury.")); Oliver v. Keller,
289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that "§ 1997e(e) requires a prior showing of
physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis."); Harris
v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that "the physical injury must
be more than de minimis, but need not be significant."); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132,
135 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that "physical injury required by § 1997e(e) must simply be
more than de minimis").
159. See supra note 158.
160. Clifton, 418 F.Supp.2d at 1246 (suggesting that "[p]ain paired with allegations
of more tangible physical effects... satisfy the PLRA's physical injury requirement.").
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stomach anxiety are de minimis symptoms" that do not meet the
PLRA requirements.161 Several hours of pain and suffering, however,
resulting from a heart attack, did meet the minimum requirements
even if there was no lasting cardiac damage. 16 2
The PLRA physical injury requirements will likely divide plaintiff-
inmates opposing shackling policies into three groups. The first group
is comprised of women who have suffered a clear injury directly re-
lated to being physically restrained during pregnancy, labor, or child-
birth. These women will have a much greater chance of success via
litigation than either women who sustained other types of injuries
or inmates who hope to prevent future physical injury by fighting
the policies themselves.
The 2005 case of Talisa Pool, an inmate at the Sebastian
Detention Center in Sebastian County, Arkansas, suggests that
women who can prove that they suffered injuries as a result of being
shackled may be able to collect damages under § 1983 despite the
heightened PLRA requirements.163 Pool, who was serving a ten-year
sentence for manslaughter, realized that she was pregnant while she
was on bond pending her appeal."3 At the time she began serving her
sentence, she reported on the standard medical form used during
booking that she was pregnant and, on the particular day she was
being processed, had begun to "pass[ ] blood clots." 165 Officials denied
Pool's requests to be transported to the emergency room and the nurse
who examined her instructed her to rest with her feet elevated.'66
Over the course of the next three days, Pool began to bleed heavily,
experienced painful cramping, and did not participate in recreation
or attend communal meals.'67 Denied a follow-up medical examination,
she was transferred by bus to a new detention facility. 6 ' During
booking at the new facility, the booking officer noticed that Pool was
bleeding through her uniform, but despite Pool's vocalized concerns
that she was miscarrying and her requests to be taken to a hospital,
she was simply instructed to shower and put on a new uniform.169
Shortly after doing so, Pool was informed that she was being trans-
ferred back to the original facility and changed back into her bloody
161. Id. at 1246 (citing Cannon v. Burkybile, No. 99 C 4623, 2000 WL 1409852, at *6
(N.D.Ill. Sept. 21, 2000)).
162. Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000).
163. Pool v. Sebastian County, Ark., 418 F.3d 934, 934-35 (8th Cir. 2005).
164. Id. at 937.
165. Id. at 938.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 938-39.
169. Id. at 939.
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uniform."17 Not until she returned to the Sebastian Detention Center
was she examined again by a nurse, who placed her in an observation
cell.1 ' Despite being told by the nurse that a physician would be
meeting with her, Pool testified at trial that she spent the next two
nights in the observation cell and never met with a doctor.172 Shortly
after midnight on the second night, Pool miscarried her four-month-
old fetus.
173
In addition to her own testimony, Pool's account was bolstered
by the affidavit of a female deputy that stated the deputy had been
on duty the night of Pool's miscarriage. 174 According to the affidavit,
the deputy had been aware that Pool had been bleeding and in pain
for several days, and had discussed the situation with other prison
officials. 175 Further, the deputy testified in the affidavit that she had
attempted to show her supervisor one of Pool's used sanitary pads
and had been sharply rebuffed. 176
The court found that Pool's case survived the defendant's motion
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 177 Citing Jolly
v. Knudsen and Johnson v. Busby, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that "Pool simply must prove that she suffered from an objec-
tively serious medical need and that Appellants knew of the need yet
deliberately disregarded it. A serious medical need is 'one that is so
obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor's attention.""7
The court rejected two major arguments put forth by the defen-
dant. First, prison officials argued that Pool did not show that her
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
According to Pool, on the second day in the observation cell, "everything just
started going crazy." Pool was in such pain she was balled up in a knot....
She was screaming, hollering and beating on the wall to try to get the
deputies to come and see her.
When the deputies came, she told them she had bled in her clothes and
that she needed to see the doctor. According to Pool, the deputies... told
her that there were no doctors, that they could not see any blood, and that
there was nothing wrong with her and she just needed to lie down and put
her feet back up. The entire time she was in the observation cell, no one
actually entered the cell until after she miscarried.
Id.
173. Id. Pool was then transported by ambulance to a local medical center, where she
underwent surgery to remove the placenta. Id.
174. Id. at 940.
175. Id.
176. Id. According to the affidavit, "Deputy Griffin's supervisor told her to quit being
an inmate-lover, to toughen up and to 'not let these people get to you.' The supervisor also
commented:'F[* * *] her [Pool], she's going to prison and doesn't need a baby anyway."' Id.
177. Id. at 945.
178. Id. at 944 (internal citation omitted).
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health, rather than the health of her fetus, had been put at suffi-
cient risk to meet the "serious medical need" requirement.179 Second,
they argued that because Pool was not visibly pregnant, her condition
was not obvious enough to meet the objective standard.8 0 The court
rejected both of these arguments:
Although Pool may not have been "showing," Pool informed
prison officials that she was pregnant, bleeding and passing blood
clots. The record also shows that Pool was in extreme pain from
the cramping, so much so that it affected her ability to perform
routine daily functions such as eating and showering.'
The Pool decision is significant for several reasons. First, it
establishes that a female inmate can survive a motion for summary
judgment when her § 1983 action is based on miscarriage;18 2 the
defendants' argument that the injuries were suffered by Pool's fetus,
rather than by Pool herself, was rejected.18 3 Second, it illustrates the
"deliberate indifference" standard, here exhibited by the Sebastian
County officials' awareness of Pool's pregnancy from her time of entry
(based on her booking forms) and worsening condition over the course
of several days.' 84 Undoubtedly, the affidavit submitted by a prison
official served as strong corroborating evidence. And finally, it sets
a high bar for "physical injury" requirements related to pregnancy.
According to the testimony of Pool and Deputy Griffin, Pool suffered
debilitating cramps. 185 The court was careful to note that Pool's con-
dition prevented her from "perform[ing] routine daily functions," 18
6
and also provided a detailed account of the days of blood loss that
culminated in a second-trimester miscarriage, the emergency trans-
portation to the hospital, and the surgical removal of the placenta." 7
Women who hope to use Pool as a "template" for § 1983 litigation
opposing shackling regulations can do so, but likely only if they
have already suffered serious injury as a result of being physically
restrained during pregnancy or childbirth.' It underlines the
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 944-45.
182. Id. at 937.
183. Id. at 944.
184. Id. at 945.
185. Id. at 938, 940.
186. Id. at 945.
187. Id. at 938-39.
188. Based on the standards outlined in Clifton, labor pain alone, even if enhanced by
the discomfort of physical restraints, would not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D. Colo. 2006) (requiring more than
a de minimis showing of physical injury). However, injuries such as those sustained by
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importance of notifying prison officials of medical issues as soon as
possible, to establish deliberate indifference. More broadly, complaints
lodged against shackling regulations in general, even when they are
not tied to medical problems or physical injuries that rise to the stan-
dard of Eighth Amendment "sufficient seriousness," could be filed in
order to build a paper trail supporting an individual's physical injury
claims at a later date."8 9 Finally, the deference the court in Pool gave
to Deputy Griffin's affidavit suggests the importance of institutional
corroboration of inmate accounts.19 ° This is clearly a challenge, but
female guards may be more sympathetic to inmates experiencing a
quintessentially female experience like pregnancy or labor.
The physical injury requirements of the PLRA will most likely
bar lawsuits brought by women who cannot document "lasting" or
"serious" physical injury. 9' The Women's Prison I case resulted in a
court order barring shackling during labor and delivery and limiting
the use of restraints during the third trimester to single leg shackles
during transportation. 192 This decision was based largely on an argu-
ment that the use of physical restraints on pregnant inmates was
an affront to human dignity and could potentially lead to future
injuries.'93 Such reasoning would not satisfy the PLRA require-
ments, 194 and so female inmates hoping to pre-empt the indignity,
discomfort, and possible serious injuries that might arise from experi-
encing pregnancy and childbirth in shackles are unlikely to find
success in the courtroom.
IV. POLITICAL REMEDIES & POLICY SOLUTIONS: ALTERNATIVES TO
LITIGATION
A. Anti-Shackling Statutes at the State Level
Traditionally, prisoners could depend on litigation as the primary
vehicle for fighting breaches of civil rights perpetrated against them
Shawanna Nelson, an Arkansas inmate profiled by The New York Times, including
"lasting back pain and damage to her sciatic nerve," have a better chance of at least
surviving a summary judgment motion. See Liptak, supra note 4.
189. Goebert v. Lee County, No. 2:04-cv-505-FtM-29DNF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31478,
at *18 (D.Fl. Dec. 7, 2005).
190. Pool, 418 F.3d at 940-41.
191. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1996); Clifton, 418 F.Supp.2d
at 1246 (suggesting pain coupled with lasting physical effects can support a viable claim).
192. Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 634,
668 (D.D.C. 1994).
193. Id.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (requiring physical injury).
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by the state or federal government.' 95 Prisoners were not guaran-
teed success, but like non-incarcerated citizens, prisoners could rely
on § 1983 as a mechanism to enforce the Constitution through the
courts.'96 However, the passage of the PLRA, with additional admin-
istrative exhaustion and physical injury proof requirements, 197 requires
prisoners to meet a much higher standard than non-incarcerated
plaintiffs.
For female inmates and their advocates hoping to limit or ban
the use of physical restraints during pregnancy and childbirth, the
physical injury requirement of the PLRA presents an especially daunt-
ing obstacle. Ultimately, anti-shackling measures are policy-driven
and preventative: proponents argue shackling pregnant inmates is an
affront to basic dignity,'98 an unnecessary measure against a group
of inmates who are much less likely to be violent or flight risks,
199
and creates the potential for future physical injury."' None of these
arguments overcome the inflexible physical injury requirement set
forth by the PLRA;2 °1 in other words, prisoners must wait to be physi-
cally disabled rather than attacking shackling regulations in advance.
In Jones v. Bock, the Roberts Court signaled its discomfort with the
administrative exhaustion component of the PLRA, but also an un-
willingness to supersede the wisdom of the legislature.0 2
Prisoners and advocates in three states - California, Illinois, and
New York - chose to forego litigation in favor of a legislative solu-
tion.20 3 In 2000, the Illinois legislature amended the state's Unified
Code of Corrections to add an anti-shackling provision,20 4 at least in
195. Kristin L. Burns, Note, Return to Hard Time: The Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 31 GA. L. REV. 879, 883 (1997).
196. Id. at 884-85.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
198. See Ayelet Waldman, Mothers in Chains: Why Keeping U.S. Women Prisoners in
Shackles During Labor and Delivery is the Real Crime Against Society, SALON, May 23,
2005, http://dir.salon.com/story/mwt/col/waldman/2005/05/23/prison/index.html.
199. See Liptak, supra note 4. Ms. Lieber, a California assemblywoman stated, "[t]hese
women are mostly in for minor crimes and don't pose a flight risk .... Id.
200. Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. V. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 634,
668 (D.D.C. 1994).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
202. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 926 (2007).
203. See Liptak, supra note 4 (stating that the New York Legislature is considering
a bill similar to those enacted by California and Illinois).
204. Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (2000):
[W]hen a pregnant female committed person is brought to a hospital from
an Illinois correctional center for the purpose of delivering her baby, no
handcuffs, shackles, or restraints of any kind may be used during her
transport to a medical facility for the purpose of delivering her baby. Under
no circumstances may leg irons or shackles or waist shackles be used on
any pregnant female committed person who is in labor. Upon the pregnant
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part because of lobbying efforts by prison advocacy groups such as
Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers (CLAIM).2 °5
In 2005, the California Legislature followed suit by passing an
anti-shackling provision.206 Prior to the passage of the bill, the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation policy was
to shackle women to their hospital beds during labor and throughout
their hospital stay.2" 7 At the time, a Department spokesperson cited
public safety concerns: "Basically, we don't want them to escape -
that's the bottom line."208 Citing the United Nations policy against
shackling pregnant prisoners and the support of industry organiza-
tions such as the California Correctional Peace Officers Association
and the American Public Health Association, the legislature chose
to ban the practice. 2 9 A current bill pending in the New York State
legislature would accomplish the same goals.210
The Illinois and California acts, as well as the pending New York
bill, do not place the public or prison personnel at risk.211 Nonetheless,
corrections officers justify shackling pregnant inmates in two major
ways: 1) physical restraints restrict prisoners' movements in a way
that protects medical personnel and prison officers, 212 and 2) prisoners
female committed person's entry to the hospital delivery room, a correctional
officer must be posted immediately outside the delivery room.
205. Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, http://claim-il.org.
206. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (2005).
207. Medical News Today, California Legislature Considering Bill That Would Ban
Shackling of Prison Inmates During Childbirth (Aug. 2005), http://www.medicalnewstoday
.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=28474 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
208. Id.
209. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7:
Pregnant inmates temporarily taken to a hospital outside the prison for the
purposes of childbirth shall be transported in the least restrictive way pos-
sible, consistent with the legitimate security needs of each inmate. Upon
arrival at the hospital, once the inmate has been declared by the attending
physician to be in active labor, the inmate shall not be shackled by the wrists,
ankles, or both, unless deemed necessary for the safety and security of the
inmate, the staff, and the public.
210. Assemb. B. 4105, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007). The bill pending in the New
York State Assembly can be read as follows:
Provides for the care and custody of pregnant female inmates before, during
and after delivery; prohibits the use of restraints of any kind from being
used during the transport of such female prisoner to a hospital for the pur-
pose of giving birth, unless such prisoner is a flight risk whereupon handcuffs
may be used; prohibits the use of any restraints during labor; requires the
presence of corrections personnel during such prisoner's transport to and
from the hospital and during her stay at such hospital.
Id.
211. See, e.g., Press Release, Cory Jasperson, Office of Assemblywomen Sally Lieber,
Governor Signs Bill to End Shackling of Women During Labor and Delivery (Oct. 7, 2005),
available at http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/a22/Press/p222005023.htm.
212. Liptak, supra note 4.
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are prevented from escaping. 213 All three pieces of legislation contain
clauses that would allow prison officials or attending physicians to
mandate the use of limited physical restraints in the case of a specific
health or security risk.214 The legislators in Illinois, California, and
New York, however, have recognized an important policy paradigm
shift: shackling pregnant inmates should be a rare exception rather
than the norm, and the decision to use physical restraints on a woman
in active labor must be made carefully and for justifiable reasons.
Rather than waiting until an injury has been sustained and
hoping their claims can overcome the PLRA procedural hurdles, prison
inmates would be better served by legislation, or at least written state
corrections policies, that ban shackling inmates during labor and
delivery. Unfortunately, prisoners as a group are unpopular with
the public,215 politically powerless, 216 and legally unsophisticated.217
Corrections policies, as a whole, are carried out, if not in secret, cer-
tainly out of public view. The passage of anti-shackling statutes, such
as those in Illinois, California, and New York, along with the continued
public advocacy by human rights groups and media coverage such
as that which accompanied a recent Amnesty International study,21 s
could go a long way to create a groundswell of support for formal
bans on unnecessarily permissive restraint policies.
B. "Catch the Hope". Pre-Empting Prisoner Litigation
In 1985, in response to numerous inmate complaints, the
Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services initiated litigation
213. Id.
214. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7(2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7; Assemb. B. 4105,
2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007). It is problematic that none of the legislation specifically
outlines who is responsible for making the final decision and at what point - before or
during labor - the decision must be made. Kim White, Regional Director, Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, Address at the William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law Symposium:
Women in Prisons (Feb. 24, 2007). Corrections departments themselves might be better
equipped to make these kinds of policy determinations, while legislators may be reluctant
to micromanage their state prison systems in this way. Id. According to the Mid-Atlantic
Regional Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, women are only shackled if the
warden of their facility has previously determined that they represent a significant risk
of flight or violence. Id. Because most of the women incarcerated in the federal prison
system are serving time for drug or other minimum security offenses, she estimated
that "99.9% of the time," women are not physically restrained during transportation or
labor itself. Id.
215. Chen, supra note 88, at 204.
216. Id. at 203-04.
217. See, e.g., id. at 225-27 (discussing the difficulty one prisoner plaintiff encountered
in determining whether there was a grievance process and how to exhaust it).
218. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE," supra note 1.
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against the Massachusetts Correctional Institute at Framingham.219
MCI-Framingham is a medium-security prison and the only all-
female correctional facility in Massachusetts;220 the complaints that
made up the basis for what became McDonald v. Fair related to
inadequate prenatal medical care and living conditions, shackling
during labor and delivery, and lack of postnatal visitation time be-
tween mothers and infants.221 While the McDonald case "lingered in
discovery," 222 a coalition of prisoners' rights groups joined with a com-
munity health center to found "Catch the Hope" (CTH), a program
that would provide adequate prenatal and postnatal care at MCI-
Framingham, within the limitations of a correctional environment.223
The program's goals included "provid[ing] comprehensive case
services management to pregnant and postpartum inmates ...
assur[ing] identification of pregnancy [and] ... promot[ing] optimal,
healthy births." 224 After two years of operation, the final federal report
before the program was transferred entirely to state control and fund-
ing, suggesting that, with almost one hundred percent participation
and improved identification, monitoring, and birth rates, CTH had
been a resounding success.225
CTH works with pregnant inmates on a number of levels, from
careful medical screening, prenatal care, substance abuse counseling,
and birth preparation,226 to the Labor and Birth Support Program,
which assigns professional birthing coaches to inmates during
pregnancy, through childbirth, and during post-natal follow-up
counseling;2 7 and finally, to post-natal custody placement programs
designed to prepare mothers for separation as well as reuniting at
the end of their term of incarceration.228
Massachusetts was driven to support the CTH program largely
because of fears of litigation, like the pending McDonald case, and
methadone licensure requirements.229 When McDonald was settled
in 1992, the terms of the court order dealt with provisions for medical
219. JILL L. FELDMAN, MCDONALD V. FAIRAND CATCHTHE HOPE: UNDERSTANDINGTHE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION AND COMMUNITYACTMSM
2,3 (2002), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/studies/STUDYPC-MA-
0001-Feldman.pdf.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 3.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 3-4.
224. Romeo, supra note 27, at 418.
225. Id. at 419.
226. Id. at 420-21.
227. Id. at 424.
228. Id. at 424-25.
229. Id. at 419.
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screening, maternity clothes, prenatal nutrition, and access to social
services, as well as limitations on the use of restraints.23 ° These mir-
rored almost exactly those policies already in place at CTH.23 The
success of "Catch the Hope," although on a small scale, suggests that
holistic programs designed to meet the needs of pregnant prison
inmates not only improve the overall physical and mental health of
prisoners and their children,232 but could pre-empt the drawn-out
and expensive prisoner litigation process.
CONCLUSION
It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing.
Hence that double system of protection that justice has set up
between itself and the punishment it imposes. Those who carry
out the penalty tend to become an autonomous sector; justice is
relieved of responsibility for it by a bureaucratic concealment of
the penalty itself.233
It has been remarkably easy for the American public to forget
about the record number of fellow citizens incarcerated in local, state,
and federal prisons. 4 Lawmakers focus on the issue of prisons and
prisoners only when it is politically advantageous to cultivate a repu-
tation for being tough on crime.235 Aside from the occasional protest
by a human rights or prisoner advocacy groups, the unspoken rule
guiding the American attitude towards the incarcerated is "out of
sight, out of mind."236
Perhaps this willful ignorance explains why a barbaric policy that
allows prison officials in the vast majority of state prison systems
and the Federal Bureau of Prisons to shackle female offenders during
late stages of pregnancy, labor, and childbirth has remained on the
books well into the 21st century.
Until the mid- 1990s, prisoners seeking redress for civil rights
violations, such as inhumane and senseless use of physical restraints,
were most likely to turn to § 1983 litigation.2 37 However, since the pas-
sage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996, prisoner plaintiff
230. Id. at 420.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 425.
233. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 10 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 2d ed., Vintage Books, 1995) (1978).
234. See Chen, supra note 88, at 204.
235. See, e.g., Peloso, supra note 89, at 1461 n.8 (providing examples of political
candidates criticizing inmates).
236. Id. at 1495 n.261.
237. See Riewe, supra note 156, at 122-23.
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access to the courts has been limited by heightened procedural and
evidentiary requirements that do not apply to the general public.
Women who have already been seriously physically injured as
a result of the use of shackles during pregnancy and childbirth may
still be able to use the court system to obtain monetary damages.
However, in order to prevent future injury or to simply protest the
practice as a human rights violation, female prisoners and their advo-
cates will most likely have to turn to alternative methods of relief. In
Illinois, California, and New York, state legislatures have severely
limited the ability of prison officials to shackle pregnant or birthing
prisoners. Meanwhile, programs like "Catch the Hope," implemented
in the Massachusetts prison system, could benefit both state officials
seeking to clear court dockets of prisoner litigation and female
inmates whose incarceration status should neither limit their access
to appropriate prenatal medical care nor force them to give birth in
chains.
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